References and Further Reading 1. Understanding the Problem of Personal Identity The persistence question, the question of what personal identity over time consists in, is literally a question of life and death:
The Problems of Personal Identity There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a wide range of questions that are at best loosely connected. Here are the most familiar: The precise meaning of these phrases is hard to pin down.
It may be, for instance, that being a philosopher and loving music belong to my identity, whereas being a man and living in Yorkshire do not. Someone else could have the same four properties but feel differently towards them, so that being a man and living in Yorkshire belong to his identity but not being a philosopher or loving music.
It contrasts with ethnic or national identity, which consists roughly of the ethnic group or nation one takes oneself to belong to and the importance one attaches to this.
Ludwig is a typical discussion of this topic. What is it to be a person? What is necessary, and what suffices, for something to count as a person, as opposed to a nonperson?
The most common answer is that to be a person at a time is to have certain special mental properties then e. Others propose a less direct connection between personhood and mental properties Chisholm What does it take for a person to persist from one time to another—to continue existing rather than cease to exist?
What determines which past or future being is you?
What is it about the way she relates then to you as you are now that makes her you? For that matter, what makes it the case that anyone at all who existed back then is you? This is sometimes called the question of personal identity over time.
An answer to it is an account of our persistence conditions.
Imagine that after your death there really will be someone, in this world or the next, who resembles you in certain ways. How would that being have to relate to you as you are now in order to be you, rather than someone else?
What would the Higher Powers have to do to keep you in existence after your death? Or is there anything they could do? The answer to these questions depends on the answer to the persistence question.
How do we find out who is who?
without being me, then psychological continuity is not enough for personal identity. Personal identity must involve something else. We can summarise the objection like this: identity does not logically allow for duplication; psychological continuity does logically allow for duplication; therefore psychological continuity cannot be identity. Psychological connectedness is a kind of direct psychological continuity. It is not transitive as it requires the holding of “direct psychological relations” (Parfit, , p. ). This contrasts with psychological continuity which is transitive because it “only requires overlapping chains of direct psychological relations” (Parfit, , p). psychology Essays | See the List of Sample Papers For Free - Bla Bla Writing. Save your time and order an essay about psychology. Get Started. Erickson’s Psychosocial theory of psychosocial development. Assess The View That Identity is Psychological Continuity.
What evidence bears on the question of whether the person here now is the one who was here yesterday?psychology Essays | See the List of Sample Papers For Free - Bla Bla Writing.
Save your time and order an essay about psychology. Get Started. Erickson’s Psychosocial theory of psychosocial development. Assess The View That Identity is Psychological Continuity.
In conclusion, after providing examples to counterclaim Locke’s argument that personal identity originates from psychological continuity it is clear that Locke’s view on identity is too flawed to be correct when defining identity for each person.
1William, Uzgalis. The basic views of personal identity I discuss here are: the body view; the brain view; the memory/character continuity view; and the simple view. Additionally, there is a new simple view called the not-so-simple simple view.
Bodily identity is the claim that personal identity is no different from identity of other objects, like a book. This view conforms to our ordinary usage of identity terms and makes sense, prima facie, but is has some glaring problems.
With an idealist view of a non-physical self, that also possesses continuity and unity it can be exposed how flawed this view of self is, and how others play no role whatsoever in the formation of the self.
A further significant objection to psychological continuity is the opposing physical continuity argument. This argues that the continuity of our identity is provided by the continuity of our bodies. This would immediately avoid Russell's objection (above) as our extension in time is only defined by the extension in time of our bodies.